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LEGISLATURES WANT TO UNLOCKDOWN, BUT
COURTS HOLD THE KEY: RESOLUTION OF
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE DISPUTES IN
CORONAVIRUS TIMES
Brian Friery*

INTRODUCTION
“I’ve never felt (as) helpless, as a business owner.”1 That is what Phil Anglin, a
Michigan pub owner, had to say about his situation in the spring of 2020.2 This was
around the time that Governor Gretchen Whitmer extended the state’s lockdown
provisions by vetoing the state legislature’s 2020 Senate Bill No. 858, An Act to
Amend 1976 PA 390 (“S.B. 858”), through which the legislature “sought to reopen
Michigan businesses subject to precautionary measures recommended by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.”3 Anglin is just one of many Michigan small
business owners who fears for his business’ future amidst the economic backlash that
coronavirus and state executives’ responses to the pandemic have brought. A June
2020 survey found that one in seven Michigan small business owners worried that
their businesses would not “survive the pandemic.”4 The Michigan Supreme Court
decided in October 2020 that the statutes Governor Whitmer relied on to extend a
state of emergency and her authority in times of emergency were invalid.5 Still, the
dispute as to what actions Governor Whitmer may take in response to the coronavirus
pandemic is likely far from over.6
*J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2022; B.A. in Political Science, The Pennsylvania State
University, 2019. Special thanks to Professor Samuel Bray for his guidance with this Note.
1. Taylor DesOrmeau, Only 28% of Michigan Businesses ‘Positive’ They’ll Survive Coronavirus, MLIVE
(May 8, 2020), https://www.mlive.com/public-interest/2020/05/only-28-of-michigan-businesses-positivetheyll-survive-coronavirus.html.
2. Id.
3. House of Representatives & Senate v. Governor, 960 N.W.2d 125, 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020), rev’d
in part sub nom., 949 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. 2020).
4. Paula Gardner, Six of Seven Michigan Small Businesses Don’t Expect to Regain Lost Sales, BRIDGE
MICH. (June 4, 2020), https://www.bridgemi.com/business-watch/six-seven-michigan-small-businesses-dontexpect-regain-lost-sales.
5. Steven H. Hilfinger, Michigan Supreme Court Decision Spurs Widespread Changes to Government
COVID-19 Response: Update for Week of October 9, 2020, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/michigan-supreme-court-decision-spurs-widespread-changes-togovernment-covid-19.
6. See id. (stating that Governor Whitmer said the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision would not effect
changes for twenty-one days, and that she “also filed a motion asking the Supreme Court to delay the Opinion’s
effective date until October 30th to ‘enable an orderly transition to manage this ongoing crisis.’”). Further,
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Michigan is just one of many states that has a conflict between its legislative and
executive branches. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin have also had coronavirus cases
decided by their states’ highest courts.7 Pennsylvania’s supreme court decided in
favor of the executive, while Wisconsin’s top court decided in favor of the
legislature.8 The differences in these decisions can be attributed to a multitude of
factors, including that different states have different constitutions and statutes in
place, different states have different public policy interests, and different states have
different political interests at play within their local political spectrums and state
courts.9
This Note will examine the efforts of the Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan
legislatures to end state executive-mandated lockdowns in the wake of
coronavirus. Section I provides background information. First, Part A describes the
conflict in Pennsylvania, where the state’s highest court held in Wolf v. Scarnati that
the state legislature lacked the power to unilaterally “overturn the Governor’s
Proclamation of Disaster Emergency.”10 Next, Part B shifts to Wisconsin, where the
state’s supreme court decided in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm that Emergency
Order 28, which banned travel and closed nonessential businesses, was illegal.11 That
order was promulgated by the state’s Department of Health Services (“DHS”)
secretary-designee, Andrea Palm.12 Finally, Part C moves to Michigan, where the
Michigan Supreme Court held in In re Certified Questions From the United States
District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division, that Governor
Whitmer “lacked the authority to declare a ‘state of emergency’ or a ‘state of disaster’
under the EMA [Emergency Management Act] after April 30, 2020, on the basis of
the COVID-19 pandemic” and that “the EPGA [Emergency Powers of Governor Act]
cannot continue to provide a basis for the Governor to exercise emergency powers.”13
Section II looks at commonalities between the courts’ decisions. It argues that
fundamentally, all of the cases boil down to whether and when legislative approval
is needed to continue a state of emergency. Further, this Section contends that the
emergency powers granted by the Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan
legislatures were all meant to vest the executive with powers only for limited periods
of time. At the expiration of those periods, the state legislatures were supposed to
have the power to extend or terminate states of emergency. As such, the courts should
have all held against the executives. Finally, Section III argues that although the
courts should have held against the executives, state legislatures should be clear as to
when extended powers they grant to executives are meant to expire absent legislative
Attorney General Dana Nessel ”announced that in response to the Supreme Court’s opinion her office would
no longer enforce the Governor’s Executive Orders through criminal prosecution.” Id. Conflicts also continue
between the executive and legislature over mask mandates. Id.
7. See infra Part I.A–B.
8. See id.
9. See Paul Crowe, PA Supreme Court Decides in Favor of Governor Wolf in Straight Party Line Vote
on Ending Emergency Declaration, ERIE CNTY. REP. (July 2, 2020), https://eriecountyreport.com/pa-supremecourt-decides-in-favor-of-governor-wolf-in-party-line-vote-on-ending-emergency-declaration/.
10. 233 A.3d 679, 707 (Pa. 2020).
11. 942 N.W.2d 900, 904–05 (Wis. 2020).
12. Id. at 905.
13. 958 N.W.2d 1, 31 (Mich. 2020).
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approval. Although some lockdown conflicts have been settled since this Note was
written in late 2020 and early 2021, litigation will likely continue with new lockdown
responses to COVID variants. As a result, the issues this Note covers and its call for
clear legislation remain relevant.
I. BACKGROUND
Many state constitutions do not include executive emergency power clauses.14
Rather, state executives often rely on legislative acts to broaden their powers in
times of emergency.15 Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan’s supreme courts all
decided cases based on the scope of the authority that state legislatures gave to
governors in times of emergency. Those cases are analyzed below.
A. Pennsylvania
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not contain an
emergency executive powers clause.16 However, on March 6, 2020, Governor Wolf
relied on Title 35 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Section 7301(c) to proclaim a
state of emergency.17 That statute states, in relevant part:
A disaster emergency shall be declared by executive order or
proclamation of the Governor upon finding that a disaster has occurred
or that the occurrence or the threat of a disaster is imminent. The state
of disaster emergency shall continue until the Governor finds that the
threat or danger has passed or the disaster has been dealt with to the
extent that emergency conditions no longer exist and terminates the
state of disaster emergency by executive order or proclamation, but no
state of disaster emergency may continue for longer than 90 days unless
renewed by the Governor. The General Assembly by concurrent
resolution may terminate a state of disaster emergency at any time.
Thereupon, the Governor shall issue an executive order or
proclamation ending the state of disaster emergency.18
On June 3, 2020, Governor Wolf extended the state of emergency for another
ninety days.19 Six days later, the Pennsylvania General Assembly resolved to end
the disaster emergency with House Resolution 836, A Concurrent Resolution
Terminating the March 6, 2020, Proclamation of Disaster Emergency issued under

14.
15.
2d 1.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See generally PA. CONST.; WIS. CONST.; MICH. CONST.
See Wolf, 233 A.3d 679; Wisconsin Legislature, 942 N.W.2d 900; In re Certified Questions, 958 N.W.
See generally PA. CONST.
See Wolf, 233 A.3d at 684.
Id. at 684–85 (quoting 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2020)) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 685.
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the hand and Seal of the Governor, Thomas Westerman Wolf (“H.R. 836”).20 The
General Assembly relied on Section 7301(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
article I, section 12 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
reach its resolution.21 Article I, section 12 states, “No power of suspending laws shall
be exercised unless by the Legislature or by its authority.”22
Accordingly, the Secretary of the Senate wrote to Governor Wolf, “‘I am
notifying you of the General Assembly’s action and the directive that you issue an
executive order o[r] proclamation ending the state of disaster emergency in
accordance with this resolution and 35 Pa.C.S. § 7301(c).’”23 Later, “[o]n June 11,
2020, Senate President Pro Tempore Joseph B. Scarnati, III, Senate Majority Leader
Jake Corman, and the Senate Republican Caucus . . . filed a Petition for Review in
the Nature of a Complaint in Mandamus in the Commonwealth Court, seeking to
enforce H.R. 836.”24 In response, Governor Wolf “filed in [the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania] an Application for the Court to Exercise Jurisdiction Pursuant to Its
King’s Bench Powers and/or Powers to Grant Extraordinary Relief. On June 17,
2020, [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] granted King‘s Bench jurisdiction and
stayed the Commonwealth Court proceedings.”25
The case ultimately turned on whether presentment was needed.26
Pennsylvania’s constitution provides:
Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of both
Houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, shall
be presented to the Governor and before it shall take effect be approved
by him, or being disapproved, shall be repassed by two-thirds of both
Houses according to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a
bill.27
The court then went through the three exceptions to this presentment rule.28 The
first is that “[a]ny concurrent resolution ‘on the question of adjournment’ need not be
presented to the Governor.”29 That exception was not in dispute in this case.30 The
next exception “is a concurrent resolution proposing a constitutional amendment.”31

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. (citing H.R. 836, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2020)).
See id. at 686; see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2021).
PA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Wolf, 233 A.3d at 686.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 687.
Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. III, § 9).
See Wolf, 233 A.3d at 687.
Id. at 688 (citing PA. CONST. art. III, § 9).
See id.
Id.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

192

3/29/2022 3:31 PM

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 48:1]

Neither party argued that this exception applied, either.32 However, the Senate
argued that the third exception applied to this situation.33 As the court explained:
The third exception to presentment is not explicitly delineated, but
rather inheres in the structure of our Charter. The presentment
requirement in Article III, Section 9 applies only to matters governed
by constitutional provisions concerning the legislative power. In other
words, it is perfectly manifest that the orders, resolutions, and votes
which must be so submitted to the Governor are, and can only be, such
as relate to and are a part of the business of legislation. Although no
provision of the Constitution explicitly withdraws non-legislative
resolutions from the requirement of presentment, such resolutions
involve only internal affairs of the legislature.34
The senators argued that “neither the Governor’s Proclamation nor H.R. 836 had
legal effect, and, thus, H.R. 836 should not be subject to presentment.”35 The court
decided that the Proclamation had legal effect because it at least “allow[ed] the
Governor to exercise powers granted to him by the General Assembly upon the
declaration of a disaster emergency.”36 The court then determined that H.R. 836 had
legal effect even though it did not require the commonwealth to spend money and
did not authorize the General Assembly to take action.37 The court reasoned that “the
purported distinction between requiring the government affirmatively to act and
prohibiting the government from taking an action is no distinction at all.”38
Next, the court reasoned that because H.R. 836 needed to be presented to the
governor and it was not, the General Assembly’s actions amounted to an
unconstitutional legislative veto.39 The court concluded that despite the Resolution’s
language that “[t]hereupon [the General Assembly resolving to terminate a state of
disaster emergency], the Governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation
ending the state of disaster emergency,” the fact that an executive order was
necessary after a congressional resolution to terminate a state of disaster emergency
meant that the executive still had an opportunity to veto the resolution.40
Finally, the senators argued that the Emergency Management Services Code,
which contains Pennsylvania Constitution Section 7301(c), was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.41 In opposition, the court held that the governor’s
proclamation had the “force of law,” but was not a law itself, so it did not violate the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id.
See id. at 690.
See id. at 688 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
See id. at 694.
See id. at 685, 695–96.
Id. at 703–04.
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nondelegation doctrine.42 Therefore, the governor’s disaster emergency was allowed
to continue, and H.R. 836 did not have the force of law.
B. Wisconsin
Similar to Pennsylvania’s constitution, Wisconsin’s constitution does not contain
an emergency executive powers clause.43 Rather, “on March 12, 2020, Governor
Evers issued Executive Order 72 ‘Declaring a Health Emergency in Response to the
COVID-19 Coronavirus.’”44 That order:
Proclaimed that a public health emergency existed in Wisconsin;
designated DHS as the lead agency to respond to the emergency;
directed DHS to take “all necessaryand appropriate measures to
prevent and respond to incidents of COVID-19 in the State”;
suspended administrative rules that the DHS Secretary thought would
interfere with the emergency response and increase the health threat;
authorized the Adjutant General to activate the National Guard to assist
in responding to the emergency; directed all state agencies to assist in
responding to the emergency; proclaimed “that a period of abnormal
economic disruption” existed; and directed the
Department
of
Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection to guard against price
gauging during the emergency.45
Then, DHS Secretary-designee Andrea Palm took action. She:
[I]ssued Emergency Order 12 on March 24, 2020, “under the
authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3) and (6) and all powers vested in
[her] through Executive Order #72, and at the direction of Governor
Tony Evers[.]” Palm’s Emergency Order 12 ordered “[a]ll individuals
present within the State of Wisconsin . . . to stay at home or at their
place of residence” with certain delineated exceptions. It remained in
effect until April 24, 2020.46
Palm followed that order with Emergency Order 28, which directed people in
Wisconsin, with few exceptions, to stay at home with the risk of punishment “by up
to 30 days imprisonment, or up to $250 fine, or both.”47 Palm relied on “‘the
authority vested in [her] by the Laws of the State, including but not limited to
[Wisconsin Statute Section] 252.02(3), (4), and (6).’”48 The order, which was set to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 704.
See generally WIS. CONST.
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Wis. 2020).
Id. at 905–06 (quoting Wis. Exec. Ord. No. 72 (Mar. 12, 2020)).
Id. at 906 (quoting Wis. Emergency Ord. 12 (Mar. 24, 2020)).
Id. (quoting Wis. Emergency Ord. 28 (Apr. 16, 2020)).
Id. at 900 (quoting Wis. Emergency Ord. 28 (Apr. 16, 2020)).
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expire on May 26, 2020, imposed various other restrictions on individuals in
Wisconsin.49
On April 21, 2020, the Wisconsin Legislature “filed an Emergency Petition for
Original Action” with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.50 The legislature argued that
when issuing Emergency Order 28, “Palm did not follow rulemaking procedures that
were required by Wis. Stat. § 227.24.”51 First, the court had to determine whether
Order 28 made a rule.52 Under Wisconsin Statute Section 227.01(13):
“Rule” means a regulation, standard, statement of policy, or
general order of general application that has the force of law and that is
issued by an agency to implement, interpret, or make specific
legislation enforced or administered by the agency or to govern the
organization or procedure of the agency. “Rule” includes a
modification of a rule under s. 227.265.53
Relying on precedent from Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Department of
Natural Resources, Columbia County, the court restated its interpretation of what a
rule is:
(1) a regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order; (2)
of general application; (3) having the effect of law; (4) issued by an
agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make specific legislation
enforced or administered by such agency as to
govern
the
interpretation or procedure of such agency.54
Using this definition, the court stated that “[t]he order regulates all persons in
Wisconsin at the time it was issued and it regulates all who will come into Wisconsin
in the future.”55 Therefore, the court determined that Order 28 was a “‘general order
of general application.’”56 This made it a rule under Wisconsin Statutes Section
227.01(13) and, therefore, it needed to be promulgated under “the rulemaking
procedures of Wis. Stat. § 227.24.”57
While addressing Palm’s assertions that she had broad powers from various
statutes, the court “employ[ed] the constitutional-doubt principle.”58 In doing so, it
“disfavor[ed] statutory interpretations that unnecessarily raise[d] serious

49. Id. (quoting Wis. Emergency Ord. 28 (Apr. 16, 2020)).
50. Id. at 907.
51. Id. at 908.
52. Id.
53. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 908 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 227.01 (2020)).
54. Id. at 909–10 (quoting Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Columbia Cnty., 280
N.W.2d 702, 707 (Wis. 1979)).
55. Id. at 910.
56. Id.
57. Palm, 942 N.W.2d at 914.
58. Id. at 912.
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constitutional questions about the statute under consideration.”59 The court went on
to explain that the legislature could not delegate its law-making power to
administrative agencies without “‘adequate standards for conducting the allocated
power.’”60 The court reasoned:
The people consent to the Legislature making laws because they
have faith that the procedural hurdles required to pass legislation limit
the ability of the Legislature to infringe on their rights. These limits
include bicameralism and presentment, Wis. Const. art. V, § 10,
quorum requirements, Wis. Const. art. IV, § 7, and journal and open
door requirements, Wis. Const. art. IV, § 10.61
Accordingly, “Palm’s Emergency Order 28 [was] declared unlawful, invalid, and
unenforceable.”62
C. Michigan
Similar to Pennsylvania and Wisconsin’s constitutions, the Constitution of
Michigan does not include an emergency executive powers clause.63 In response to
the coronavirus pandemic, Governor Whitmer “issued Executive Order (EO) No.
2020-04, declaring a ‘state of emergency’ under the EPGA and the EMA.”64
Subsequently, Governor Whitmer issued executive orders forcing people in Michigan
to stay at home and, under EEO 2020-17 (issued on March 20, 2020), forbidding
“medical providers from performing nonessential procedures.”65 On April 1, the
governor “issued EO 2020-33, which declared a ‘state of emergency’ under the
EPGA and a ‘state of emergency’ and ‘state of disaster’ under the EMA.”66 Later,
she “requested that the Legislature extend the state of emergency and state of disaster
by 70 days, and a resolution was adopted, extending the state of emergency and state
of disaster, but only through April 30, 2020.”67 On April 30, Governor Whitmer
issued executive orders that ended “the declaration of a state of emergency and state
of disaster under the EMA.”68 However, subsequently, “she issued EO 2020-67,
which provided that a state of emergency remained declared under the EPGA. At the
same time, she issued EO 2020-68, which redeclared a state of emergency and state
of disaster under the EMA.”69 Healthcare providers who “were prohibited from
performing nonessential procedures while EO 2020–17 was in effect and a patient
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 913 (quoting Martinez v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab.& Hum. Rel., 479 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Wis. 1992)).
Id. at 912.
Id. at 918.
See generally MICH. CONST.
In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 2020).
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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who was prohibited from undergoing knee-replacement surgery” sued “the Governor,
the Attorney General, and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and
Human Services” in federal court.70
The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan then sent
two questions to the Michigan Supreme Court for it to interpret certain aspects of
Michigan law.71 First, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the question of
“whether, under the EMA or the EPGA, the Governor has had the authority after
April 30, 2020, to issue or renew any executive orders related to the COVID-19
pandemic.”72 The relevant part of the EMA stated:
The governor shall, by executive order or proclamation, declare a
state of emergency if he or she finds that an emergency has occurred or
that the threat of an emergency exists. The state of emergency shall
continue until the governor finds that the threat or danger has passed,
the emergency has been dealt with to the extent that
emergency
conditions no longer exist, or until the declared state of emergency has
been in effect for 28 days. After 28 days, the governor shall issue an
executive order or proclamation declaring the state of emergency
terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension of the
state of emergency for a specific number of days is approved by
resolution of both houses of the legislature.73
The legislature never approved an extension of the state of emergency.74
Although Governor Whitmer terminated the state of emergency and state of disaster
after twenty-eight days, she immediately proclaimed new ones.75 The court reasoned
that the legislature probably did not intend to allow the governor to unilaterally
proclaim new states of emergency and disaster upon expiration of previous ones, as
“[t]o allow such a redeclaration would effectively render the 28-day limitation a
nullity.”76
The court next addressed the governor’s argument that disallowing the
governor’s redeclaration of states of emergency and disaster amounted to a legislative
veto.77 The court quickly dismissed the governor’s argument, stating:
These provisions impose nothing more than a durational limitation
on the Governor’s authority. The Governor’s declaration of a state of
emergency or state of disaster may only endure for 28 days absent
legislative approval of an extension. So, if the Legislature does

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.403 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
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nothing, as it did here, the Governor is obligated to terminate the state
of emergency or state of disaster after 28 days. A durational limitation
is not the equivalent of a veto.78
The court further reasoned that the time limit did not veto executive action, as it
merely “limited the amount of time the Governor can act independently of the
Legislature in response to a particular emergent matter.”79 Therefore, the court
concluded that Governor Whitmer lacked “the authority under the EMA to renew her
declaration of a state of emergency or state of disaster based on the COVID-19
pandemic after April 30, 2020.”80
The court then considered the question of whether the EPGA authorized the
governor’s subsequent state of emergency after April 30, 2020.81 The court reasoned
that because one of the conditions that allowed a governor to proclaim a state of
emergency and use her emergency powers is a time “when public safety is
imperiled,”82 the most reasonable way to read it was the way the governor read it
when issuing her orders.83
Next, the court considered the federal district court’s question of “whether the
EPGA and/or the EMA violate the Separation of Powers and/or the Nondelegation
Clauses of the Michigan Constitution.”84 Michigan’s constitution provides:
The powers of government are divided into three branches:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch
except as expressly provided in this constitution.85
The court reasoned that the EPGA is very broad in its scope, giving the governor
the power to proclaim orders “to protect life and property or to bring the emergency
situation within the affected area under control.”86 The court decided that the Act
gave the governor police power, which is typically legislative.87 The court then
considered the duration of the governor’s granted authority.88 Because the only
durational limit to the delegated authority was “until a ‘declaration by the governor
that the emergency no longer exists,’”89 the court concluded that “under the EPGA,

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

In re Certified Questions, 958 N.W.2d at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.31 (2020)).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 16 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2).
Id. at 20 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.31 (2020)).
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.31 (2020)).
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the state’s legislative authority, including its police powers, may conceivably be
delegated to the state’s executive authority for an indefinite period.”90
Then, the court considered the “standards of delegated power,” stating: “When
the scope of the power delegated ‘increases to immense proportions . . . the standards
must be correspondingly more precise.’”91 The court determined that many of the
EPGA’s limits were based on “reasonableness,” which was not much of a limit at
all.92 Further, it found that the word “necessary” did not add many restrictions.93
Given this lack of constraints, the court found the EPGA to be unconstitutional
because it “purports to delegate to the executive branch the legislative powers of state
government—including its plenary police powers—and to allow the exercise of such
powers indefinitely. As a consequence, the EPGA cannot continue to provide a basis
for the Governor to exercise emergency powers.”94

II. COMPARISON OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan supreme courts all decided their
cases on some common grounds. Statutory interpretation and bicameralism factored
into all three of the decisions. Ultimately, the issue all three of these courts had to
decide was whether the executive and legislature had to agree for emergency powers
to take effect or extend in duration. Although the courts considered different facts,
statutes, and state constitutions, they all should have decided against their executives.
A. Common Issues
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Wolf on the basis of presentment,
concluding that the legislature could not unilaterally end the governor’s state of
disaster emergency. In doing so, it considered its state constitution, which requires,
with some exceptions:
Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of both
Houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, shall
be presented to the Governor and before it shall take effect be approved
by him, or being disapproved, shall be repassed by two-thirds of both
Houses according to the rules and limitations prescribed in case of a
bill.95

90. Id. at 21.
91. Id. at 22 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C. 1986)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 22–23.
94. Id. at 31.
95. PA. CONST. art. III, § 9. The exceptions are concurrent resolutions “on the question of adjournment,”
concurrent resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, and concurrent resolutions not “concerning the
legislative power.” Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 687 (Pa. 2020).
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The statute Governor Wolf relied on to declare a state of disaster emergency
reads, “The General Assembly by concurrent resolution may terminate a state of
disaster emergency at any time. Thereupon, the Governor shall issue an executive
order or proclamation ending the state of disaster emergency.”96
The plain reading of this statute appears to require the governor to proclaim an
end to a state of disaster emergency immediately after the General Assembly resolves
to end a state of disaster emergency. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
determined that the Constitution of Pennsylvania required presentment.97 That
determination is not without controversy, however.
The Constitution of
Pennsylvania requires “every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of
both Houses may be necessary” to be presented to the governor.98 The use of the
word “may” appears to mean that some joint resolutions might not need to be
presented to the governor.
Further, Justice Dougherty argued in his concurring and dissenting opinion that
the “only reasonable” way to read Section 7301(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution
is to avoid presentment.99 In reading this statute to be an unconstitutional attempt to
forgo the presentment requirement, the part that Governor Wolf relied on to continue
his state of disaster emergency cannot be salvaged.100 Pennsylvania’s constitution
does not allow for a court to sever a statute that the legislature cannot be presumed
to have passed without the “void provision.”101 As the majority held that presentment
of H.R. 836 was necessary, a finding, based on a plain reading of the statute, that the
statute is meant to curtail the presentment requirement would require the entire statute
to be void. If the statute were void, the governor would have no power to declare a
disaster emergency since the provision of Section 7301(c) that states: “A disaster
emergency shall be declared by executive order or proclamation of the Governor
upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence or the threat of a
disaster is imminent” would be void with the rest of the statute.102
The statutory interpretation the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used in finding
Section 7301(c) to require presentment is in opposition to the statutory interpretation
the Michigan Supreme Court used in In re Certified Questions. There, after finding
96. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2021).
97. See Wolf, 233 A.3d at 707.
98. PA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (emphasis added).
99. Wolf, 233 A.3d at 707–08 (Dougherty, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
100. Id. at 712 (stating, “To recognize the legislature’s intent in this regard is to effectively answer the
question of severability: because the legislature operated under the assumption it could end a state of disaster
emergency without presentment, and the majority of this Court now reaches the opposite conclusion, ‘it cannot
be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one[.]’”
(quoting PA CONS. STAT. § 1925 (2021)).
101. PA CONS. STAT. § 1925 (2021). The complete statute reads:
The provisions of every statute shall be severable. If any provision of any statute or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the statute, and the application of such provision
to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby, unless the court finds that the valid provisions
of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the void provision or
application, that it cannot be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid
provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the remaining valid provisions, standing alone,
are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. Id.
102. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2021)).
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that the EPGA was unconstitutional because of the immense powers it granted to the
executive,103 the court looked to the issue of severability.104 The In re Certified
Questions court looked at the legislature’s intent in passing the EPGA, which was “to
invest the governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the
police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and conditions
during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or disaster.”105 The court
concluded that taking away the unconstitutional provision of the Act, which gave the
governor “the power ‘to protect life and property,’” amounted to no delegation to the
governor to “control . . . persons and conditions” unless that power were used “to
‘bring the emergency situation within the area under control.’”106 Therefore, such a
severance would contravene the legislature’s intent to give the governor broad power
in times of emergency, so the EPGA had to be declared “unconstitutional in its
entirety.”107
Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Michigan Supreme Court
decisions have an initial difference. Pennsylvania’s highest court was willing to look
past the plain meaning of the statute under consideration—which was to give the
governor broad powers in times of emergency, subject to Congress’ power to end a
state of disaster emergency—to find the statute constitutional with a presentment
requirement despite likely legislative intent to the contrary. On the other hand,
Michigan’s highest court—upon finding that the statute it considered was
unconstitutional—looked at legislative intent and found the statute to be
unsalvageable. The approaches to legislative concurrence and vetoes will be
discussed further in Part C.
Another common issue across multiple cases was nondelegation. In the
Michigan Supreme Court’s case, the court explicitly reviewed its issue against a
nondelegation backdrop and found that the EPGA unconstitutionally granted the
governor legislative powers.108 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin similarly held that
the delegation of legislative power to the executive was unconstitutional given its
lack of constraints upon the executive.109 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
an outlier on the nondelegation issue, holding that there were adequate safeguards in
place to check the governor, stating that “[b]road discretion and standardless
discretion are not the same thing.”110 Such a wide grant of legislative power without
the legislature’s retained power to end a state of disaster emergency brings up
constitutional concerns, as it effectively allows a governor to continue his time of
extended power indefinitely unless a supermajority of the General Assembly
overrides him.111 Nondelegation is discussed more in Part B.

103. In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1, 24 (Mich. 2020).
104. Id. at 24–25.
105. Id. at 25 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.32 (2021).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 25.
108. Id. at 24.
109. Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 913 (Wis. 2020).
110. Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 705 (Pa. 2020).
111. See Mark Chenoweth, When the Wolf at the Door is Your Governor, FORBES (July 2, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markchenoweth/2020/07/02/when-the-wolf-at-the-door-is-your-
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The final similar issue across the Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan high
court cases is the legislative veto. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
skirting presentment to the governor to end a state of emergency amounted to an
unconstitutional legislative veto.112 However, the dissent argued that a legislative
veto should not be banned per se.113 In Palm, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s
majority opinion did not explicitly consider the issue of a legislative veto,114 but one
of the dissenting justices reasoned:
If rulemaking is understood as establishing a check on how a law
is prospectively understood, that could be justified as retaining the
legislature’s constitutional prerogative to determine the state’s public
policy. But if rulemaking morphs into subjecting executive branch
enforcement of enacted laws to a legislative veto, that turns
our
constitutional structure on its very head.115
The Michigan Supreme Court considered the limit on the length of a governor’s
state of emergency or state of disaster to simply be a durational limit and not a
legislative veto.116 Legislative veto questions must be decided on the basis of
whether provisions that are, in form, legislative vetoes must be held invalid per se, or
if there are constitutional ways to have, in effect, legislative vetoes. If requiring
legislative action for executive power to be in effect is held constitutional, that
holding must be squared with the fact that such a framework is more restrictive than
a provision requiring the legislature to affirmatively act to end the governor’s
extended powers.117 The legislative veto will be explored more fully in Part C.

governor/#62804a7d5927 (“[I]f the statute under which the governor declared an emergency really allows him
to enjoy legislative power that the legislature cannot take back without his permission, then that statute is
unconstitutional.”). See also Wolf, 233 A.3d at 716–17 (Saylor, C.J., dissenting) (“It also seems to me to be
quite unlikely that the Legislature would have conferred such a broad delegation of emergency powers upon
the Governor while apprehending that the contemplated legislative oversight was subordinate to a gubernatorial
veto, thus affording the executive the ability to require a supermajority vote.”).
112. Wolf, 233 A.3d at 694.
113. Id. at 715 (Saylor, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe that the present context presents a compelling case that
legislative vetoes should not be regarded as being per se violative of separation-of-powers principles.”).
114. See Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2020).
115. Id. at 964 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).
116. In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich.
2020) (“[C]ontrary to the Governor’s argument, the 28-day limitation in the EMA does not amount to an
impermissible ‘legislative veto.’”).
117. See Olafur Olafsson, Constitutionality of Legislative Approval of Rules, 74 MICH. BAR J. 290, 291
(1995) (“Logically, the veto power is subject to all the arguments set forth against the suspension power and
raises additional concerns. By the same logic, if a legislative veto is unconstitutional, an affirmative approval
requirement is even more objectionable, since it stays the executive hand more completely by a combination of
defiance and legislative inaction. Still, approval is merely a more pervasive and extreme version of the veto,
not a major change in imposing the legislative will on the executive branch.”).
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B. Nondelegation
Despite arguments that the nondelegation doctrine is not “historical[ly]
justifi[ed]” and is “largely forgotten,”118 the scope and validity of the nondelegation
doctrine have been under debate for hundreds of years.119 Centuries of nondelegation
jurisprudence provide principles too ingrained in American law to ignore. In
Wayman v. Southard, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Chief Justice Marshall, held that state legislatures did not have authority to regulate
proceedings relating to federal writs of execution within their boundaries.120 Rather,
Congress had delegated the exclusive authority to set procedures to federal courts.121
The Court held that Congress had the power to administer justice and had
constitutionally delegated that power to the federal courts.122 The Court further
argued that the power to administer justice implied upon federal courts the “power to
set the necessary procedures to” administer justice.123 Chief Justice Marshall set
limits on the power to delegate, however, stating: “It will not be contended that
Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are
strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others,
powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”124 The Chief Justice
continued:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes
the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the
discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this
power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily.125
Thus, although the Supreme Court recognized the right to delegate some power
in Wayman, it did so with the understanding that there were limits and Congress could
not delegate its essential powers to another branch.126
The principle that the legislative power may not be transferred to another branch
was reiterated in the most modern United States Supreme Court case to consider

118. Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Baglet, There’s No Historical Justification for One of the Most
Dangerous
Ideas
in
American
Law,
ATLANTIC
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/nondelegation-doctrine-orliginalism/612013/.
119. See
Nondelegation
Doctrine:
A
Timeline,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Nondelegation_doctrine:_a_timeline (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) [hereinafter NonDelegation Doctrine].
120. Wayman v. Southard, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wayman_v._Southard (last visited Dec.
29, 2021).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42).
125. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 46.
126. See id. at 1.
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nondelegation, Gundy v. United States.127 There, the Court also stated the principle
“that a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress ‘lay[s] down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.’”128 The Court then stated
that a statutory delegation may be interpreted “in light of its “purpose[,] factual
background[,] [and] context” to find whether there are “sufficiently ‘definite’
standards.”129 The Court then considered the “context, purpose, and history” of the
challenged statute and found that it only gave the attorney general discretion to
consider feasibility issues when determining who had to register as a sex offender in
his or her state of residence.130
As discussed above, the nondelegation issue arose in Pennsylvania with Wolf, in
Wisconsin with Palm, and in Michigan with In re Certified Questions. The
Wisconsin and Michigan supreme courts held that their executives possessed
unconstitutionally delegated power, while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that there was not an illegal delegation of power. In Palm, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin applied similar standards to those found in United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence, stating, “[a] delegation of legislative power to a subordinate agency
will be upheld if the purpose of the delegating statute is ascertainable and there are
procedural safeguards to insure that the board or agency acts within that legislative
purpose.”131 DHS Secretary-designee Palm relied on an executive order to “create
criminal penalties for violations of Order 28.”132 Such lawmaking power without
any safeguards is a clear violation of the nondelegation doctrine. Palm asserted
powers going beyond the governor’s “public health emergency declaration,” thus
eliminating any safeguards that a durational limitation on the governor’s executive
order may have imposed.133 A governor may not delegate power to others within the
executive branch to circumvent the nondelegation doctrine.134In In re Certified
Questions, the Michigan Supreme Court considered whether the EPGA
unconstitutionally granted the governor legislative powers. The court simplified
principles from numerous cases on the nondelegation doctrine to state that “as the
scope of the powers conferred upon the Governor by the Legislature becomes
increasingly broad, in regard to both the subject matter and their duration,
the standards imposed upon the Governor’s discretion by the Legislature must
correspondingly become more detailed and precise.”135 Because the governor was

127. See Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 119; Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019)
(“The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of
Government.”).
128. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2119 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)) (internal
citation omitted).
129. Id. at 2123 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104–05 (1946)).
130. Id. at 2123–24.
131. Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 913 (Wis. 2020) (quoting J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis.
State Bldg. Comm’n, 336 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)).
132. Id.
133. Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, WIS. INST. L. & LIBERTY, https://will-law.org/wisconsin-legislature-vpalm/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
134. Id.
135. In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Mich. 2020).
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given immense power over an indefinite length of time, the words “reasonable” and
“necessary” were deemed inadequate limitations on the governor’s exercise of
legislative power.136
The Michigan Supreme Court considered legislative intent, which was spelled
out in Section 10.32 of the EPGA:
It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent to invest the
governor with sufficiently broad power of action in the exercise of the
police power of the state to provide adequate control over persons and
conditions during such periods of impending or actual public crisis or
disaster. The provisions of this act shall be broadly construed to
effectuate this purpose.137
The court determined that the EPGA would only stand up to a nondelegation
challenge if it were construed to grant the governor power more narrowly than the
legislature intended.138 Because the legislature intended to grant such broad power
to the executive under the EPGA, the court held that the EPGA was
unconstitutional.139 Although the duration of powers need not be part of a
nondelegation analysis, an otherwise broad delegation of powers may be
constitutional with a reasonable duration. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that durational limitations could be adequate to allow certain delegations of
power, as the Michigan Supreme Court pointed out.140 With no intelligible principle
to limit the governor’s lawmaking powers, no durational or other limitations on the
governor’s exercise of that power, and a clear purpose to grant the governor very
broad police power in times of emergency, the Michigan Supreme Court made a wellreasoned decision to hold the EPGA unconstitutional.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the nondelegation
doctrine and concluded that the governor’s orders did not violate it.141 The purpose
of Section 7301(c) appears to be to give the executive the power to enter a state of
disaster emergency, but to require the governor to end the state of disaster emergency
if a concurrent resolution of the General Assembly agrees to terminate the state of
disaster emergency.142 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, decided that
the governor’s Proclamation and H.R. 836 had legal effect, but the governor’s
Proclamation was not an actual law, so it did not violate the nondelegation
doctrine.143 Therefore, the court held that the General Assembly had to present H.R.
836 to the governor, but the governor’s Proclamation, which had the force of law,
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 12 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 10.32 (West 2020)).
138. Id. at 24.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 11 (quoting Immigr. Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.19 (1983))
(“Indeed, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha . . . itself expressly recognized that ‘durational limits
on authorizations . . . lie well within Congress’ constitutional power.’”).
141. Wolf v. Scarnati, 233 A.3d 679, 707 (Pa. 2020).
142. See id. at 684 (quoting 35 Pᴀ. Cᴏɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 7301(c) (2020)).
143. See id. at 704.
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was not an actual law, so it did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.144 This
interpretation goes against the plain meaning of Section 7301(c), which states that
“the governor shall issue an executive order or Proclamation ending the state of
disaster emergency” upon the General Assembly’s concurrent resolution to terminate
the state of disaster emergency.145 By holding that there was legal effect to the
governor’s Proclamation so there was not an exception to Pennsylvania’s
constitution’s presentment requirement at play, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
took an interpretation of Section 7301(c) that violates the nondelegation doctrine by
giving the governor unilateral authority to continue to use the excessive powers that
a proclamation of disaster emergency grants him.
To conclude that the Proclamation had “the force of law” without being a law,
so it did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, which “forbids entities other than the
legislative branch from exercising the ‘legislative power,’ as those entities do not
have ‘the power to make law,’” means applying form over substance to a doctrine
that regularly looks to the substance of authority delegations.146 To give the governor
the power to make proclamations with the force of law without giving Congress, the
lawmaking branch, the ability to take that power away unless the governor agrees to
give that power away upon presentment or a supermajority overrides him, goes
against the pillar of nondelegation that disallows broad delegations of power without
limitations.147 As the dissent pointed out, the General Assembly delegated to the
governor the power to declare an emergency and gave him “an extraordinary set of
[legislative] powers” in such a case, but “quite rationally reserved” the ability to
decide whether there is actually a disaster emergency and “override the Governor’s
declaration of an emergency upon the passage of a concurrent resolution.”148
C. Legislative Concurrence
The highest courts of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan all considered the
issue of whether the legislative and executive branches had to concur in decisions to
extend or terminate periods of heightened executive power. More narrowly, they all
considered the legislative veto, whether it was at play in their respective cases, and
whether legislative vetoes should be per se unconstitutional.
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan have adopted similar approaches to the
federal government in their legislative veto judgments. The Supreme Court of

144. See id. at 707.
145. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2021) (emphasis added).
146. See Wolf, 233 A.3d at 704 (citing Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 161
A.3d 827, 833 (2017)); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“In
determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that
assistence [sic] must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination.”). Such an inquiry into the extent and character of assistance involves the “substance over form”
inquiry that is typical of nondelegation-related United States Supreme Court opinions.
147. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 9 (requiring a two-thirds vote of both Houses to repass a resolution after the
governor disapproves it at presentment).
148. Wolf, 233 A.3d at 713 (Saylor, C.J., dissenting).
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Pennsylvania adopted the federal approach in Commonwealth v. Sessoms,149 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied an approach similar to the federal approach in
Martinez v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,150 and a plurality
of the Michigan Supreme Court applied the federal approach in Blank v. Dep’t. of
Corrections.151
The federal legislative veto was commonly used from its inception in the 1930s
until the early 1980s.152 It served as an effective way for Congress to check the
Executive in order to uphold separation of powers in the face of delegated
authority.153 Debate picked up in the leadup to Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha.154 There, the Supreme Court held that neither house of Congress
acting independently or concurrently could “require the Attorney General to deport
an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated
authority, had determined the alien should remain in the United States.”155 This was
due to the Presentment Clauses of Article I of the United States Constitution, which
could not be skirted by an act of Congress.156 The Court did, however, note that
some legislative actions do not require presentment:
Not every action taken by either House is subject to the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. See post, at
2786. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an
exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon
“whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as
legislative in its character and effect.”157
The Chadha Court’s decision to declare the legislative veto illegal faced early
criticism for its “oversimplistic . . . answer to the problem of the legislative veto.”158
Adopting the Chadha reasoning to Pennsylvanian constitutional law, however,
also implies an adoption of its exceptions to the presentment requirement which,
149. Id. at 688 (citing Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 778 (Pa. 1987)).
150. See Martinez v. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Hum. Rels., 478 N.W.2d 582, 582–87 (Wis. 1992).
151. See In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., S. Div., 958 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2020)
(citing Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 2000) (plurality opinion)).
152. The Legislative Veto, Lᴇɢᴀʟ Iɴғᴏ. Iɴsᴛ., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article1/section-7/clause-1-3/the-legislative-veto (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
153. Legislative Veto After Chadha: Hearing on the Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in the Case of
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha Which Found the Legislative Veto Unconstitutional Before
the H. Comm. on Rules, 98th Cong. 2 (1984) (statement of Rep. Claude Pepper, Chairman, H. Comm. on Rules).
154. Legislative Veto Proposals: Hearing on S. 890 and S. 684 Before the S. Subcomm. on Agency Admin.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 227 (1981) (statement of the Am. Gas Ass’n) (“While we take no
general position on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes, we believe that Congress must be aware that an
across-the-board legislative veto will be challenged, and its efficacy will be determined by the courts.”)
[hereinafter Hearing on S. 890 & S. 684]; see also Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983). This statement proved to be fortuitous, as Chadha was decided just two years later.
155. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 921–22.
156. Id. at 953–54.
157. Id. at 952 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1335, at 8 (1897)).
158. Hearing on S. 890 & S. 684, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting former Dean of Harvard Law School, Dean
Tribe).
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other than what is explicitly in the Constitution, are things that are not substantively
legislative.159 It is strange to consider the governor’s proclamation of a state of
disaster emergency not a law but an enactment with legal effect while holding the
legislature’s concurrent resolution to end the emergency to be legislative. The
legislature is in the business of lawmaking, and merely suspending an action with
legal effect seems to fit the Supreme Court’s exception that something not legislative
in its character and effect is immune from presentment requirements.160
Further, Section 7301(c)’s statement that “no state of disaster emergency may
continue for longer than 90 days unless renewed by the Governor”161 seems to be a
clear durational limit allowed by Chadha. The limit would be without much force if
the governor could simply renew it and require a supermajority to overrule his
renewal.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rightfully did not put much consideration into
the dissent’s argument that invalidation of the statutes under consideration may
legitimize a legislative veto.162 Broad delegations of power without any regulation
are, for the nondelegation reasons explained above, unconstitutional.
The Michigan Supreme Court also dealt with a challenge that a judicial veto was
at play.163 However, because Chadha allows time limits, it quickly dismissed the
challenge.164 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should have arrived at the same
conclusion, as it is likely that both the Pennsylvania and Michigan legislatures
intended to condition extended delegations of authority to the executive on legislative
approval.
These cases illustrate the difficulty for legislatures that, for practical reasons,
wish to delegate some of their tasks to executives but wish to keep safeguards in
place. If legislative vetoes are to be disallowed, time limits seem to be reasonable
safeguards against executive overuse of the lawmaking power. Still, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was given a case that seemed to clearly place a time limit on
the executive’s elevated powers, but it concluded that presentment was necessary.
Therefore, it seems that the best solution is to be clear in constitutions or statutes
when a congress may end extended executive powers. If legislatures hope to have
their intent enacted, they may need to be proactive and anticipate executive
challenges that will be upheld by courts that align with the opposing executives.
Fundamentally, the Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan cases decided
whether the legislature and executive needed to be in concurrence to continue an
executive’s time of elevated powers. “Statutes defining executive authority during
an emergency cannot be modified by executive order.”165 That makes them powerful
checks on executive power. In the cases above, some statutes limiting power were

159. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
160. See id.
161. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301(c) (2021).
162. See Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 964 (Wis. 2020) (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).
163. In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Mich., 958 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 2020).
164. Id.
165. Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8,
2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversight-of-executive-orders.aspx.
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upheld. Joint or single-house resolutions in state congresses commonly limit
executive emergency powers across states not studied in this Note.166 If legislative
vetoes were per se unconstitutional, many states would lose important checks on
executive power. Although this Note does not argue that legislative vetoes should be
legalized across the board, state legislatures should put thought into whether
bicameralism and presentment are more important than limits on executive power. If
limits on executives’ use of legislative authority are valued more than presentment,
perhaps state legislatures should amend their constitutions to allow their congresses
to terminate states of emergency without presentment. However, delegations of
legislative power may themselves be unconstitutional per se, yet courts allow them.
For state supreme courts that wish to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s
approach to the legislative veto, more thought should be put into Justice Scalia’s view
that “[s]trictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power.”167
Given that view, Pennsylvania’s legislature’s delegation of legislative power to its
governor could be declared per se unconstitutional. Only with a check such as one
allowing the legislature to end a state of emergency should broad delegation possibly
be considered constitutional. It seems that courts may be too quick to overhaul
legislative limits on executive power as “legislative vetoes” without considering
nondelegation and the deeper separation of powers that is so important to the federal
and state governments. Perhaps courts should weigh the benefits and drawbacks of
presentment with those of legislative vetoes before declaring either nondelegation or
legislative vetoes per se unconstitutional.

III. THE CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION: CLEAR CONSTITUTIONS AND
STATUTES
Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives responded to its supreme court’s
decision to allow the governor to continue the state of disaster emergency by
proposing a constitutional amendment to limit the governor’s state of disaster
emergency to twenty-one days and another amendment that would allow the General
Assembly to end a state of disaster emergency.168 A majority in both houses of the
Pennsylvania General Assembly needs to pass the amendments in successive
legislative sessions and secure voter approval for the amendments to take effect.169
Because Pennsylvania put disaster emergency powers in its constitution, it limited
the General Assembly’s ability to quickly adapt to unfavorable executive and judicial
decisions. That is where Michigan might have been more effective with creating
legislation that could more easily be molded to specific situations. The EMA, as the
Michigan Supreme Court held, adequately limited the duration of the executive’s
expanded power. If Pennsylvania had not etched its massive delegation of power to
166. See id.
167. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 419 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Ford Turner, Pennsylvania House Committee Approves Bill for Constitutional Amendment to Limit
Governor’s Emergency Declarations to 21 Days, MORNING CALL (Jan. 13, 2021, 6:03 PM),
https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/capitol-ideas/mc-nws-pa-emergencies-governor-lawmakers20210113-p77s5ww7mzeofly2vbyvdlen2m-story.html.
169. Id. See also PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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the governor in its constitution, the legislature could have more easily passed
legislation to work around possible adverse judgments.
Ultimately, however, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
would have held time constraints such as the one in Michigan’s EMA to be adequate.
After all, with an elongated view of what constitutes a legislative veto similar to the
dissent’s view in Michigan’s case, a statute with a time limit might be held
unconstitutional. If legislative vetoes are to be looked at so widely, a constitutional
amendment to add another exception may be the best option. It remains to be seen
whether Pennsylvania’s amendments will pass, but such an attempt demonstrates the
lengths a legislature must go to in order to avoid repercussions from an adverse
executive and judiciary. The issue could have been avoided had the requirement that
the governor must announce the termination of a state of disaster emergency been
excluded from the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Although it is likely that only a
ceremonial role was meant for the executive, ambiguity allowed an executive and a
court to construe the words to limit the legislature’s ability to suspend elongated
powers without the governor’s approval. Although overinclusive state constitutions
should be avoided,170 legislatures should constrain their executives and supreme
courts from making too much of ceremonial rules such as Pennsylvania’s
requirement that the governor declare an end to a disaster emergency.
Constitutional clarity may be needed to constrain state supreme courts that are
likely to decide issues based on their alignment with their governors. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania consisted of six Democrats and one Republican, and it sided
with its Democratic governor in Wolf.171 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin had a
five-to-two conservative leaning that ruled against its Democratic executive in
Wisconsin Legislature.172 Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court had a four-to-three
Republican-appointed balance at the time of In re Certified Questions, corresponding
with its holding that invalidated its Democratic governor’s expanded powers.173
Partisan judicial decisions cannot be easily corrected, but the constitution with which
courts must abide can constrain them.

CONCLUSION
For Phil Anglin and other small business owners, the lockdowns have been
devastating. This Note does not address the multitude of policy arguments for and
against lockdowns, but ill-reasoned opinions can have strong effects. There is
certainly a place for these policy considerations, and it might lie in legislatures—the

170. Daniel J. Erspamer, Constitutional Reform Needed to Bring Jobs and Opportunity to Louisiana,
PELICAN INST. PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 5, 2019), https://pelicaninstitute.org/blog/constitutional-reform-needed-tobring-jobs-and-opportunity-to-louisiana/.
171. Pennsylvania Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_Supreme_Court
(last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
172. Laurel White, Experts: Slimmer Conservative Majority on Wisconsin Supreme Court Could Unite
Justices, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 4, 2020, 5:35 AM), https://www.wpr.org/experts-slimmer-conservativemajority-wisconsin-supreme-court-could-unite-justices.
173. Michigan
Supreme
Court
Elections,
2020,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Supreme_Court_elections,_2020 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
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bodies that created the statutes that were too ambiguous for clear application. As
Pennsylvania’s congress learned, certainty is often favorable. Certainty is
undoubtedly favorable to a legislature when the risks of uncertainty create conflicts,
and clearly spelling out exceptions to rules such as presentment is an efficient way to
ensure legislative intent is followed. This is particularly true where the intent deals
with delegation of congressional powers which threatens constitutional balances of
powers.
Anglin is just one example. If legislatures want to avoid undesirable
consequences, they should ensure that their intentions are clearly stated in any cases
in which they delegate legislative power to another branch of government. Disasters
have shown some executives’ willingness to expand their powers, often at the loss of
individual rights. This issue will likely continue with new COVID strains developing
every few months. While judges may not have interpreted all of the cases studied
above correctly, legislatures should seek to avoid situations that could take their
constituents’ rights away by etching their intentions into law.

